

VIETNAM COURIER

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Up to October 7, 1967:

**2,385 U.S. PLANES
DOWNED IN NORTH V.N.**

NORTH VIETNAM

U.S. AIR RAIDS DULY PUNISHED IN SEPTEMBER 1967

☆ **93 Planes Downed Including 31 in Hai Phong, 15 in Quang Binh, 2 B.52s in Vinh Linh, 12 by Viet Nam Air Force.**

HAI PHONG : An A.A. battery manned by young militia women of factory X, which has taken part in over fifty battles against U.S. planes.

QUANG TRI : With their "steel legs and iron shoulders" the L.A.F. gunners carry pick-a-back their artillery pieces up hill and down dale.



SOUTH VIETNAM

THE L.A.F. CONTINUE TO CARRY THE DAY



☆ **QUANG TRI :** 960 Enemy Troops Wiped Out, 7 Tanks Destroyed at Con Tien and Gio Linh (Sept. 22-25).

☆ **QUANG NAM :** 10 Enemy Positions Attacked, 536 Soldiers Put out of Action (Nights of Sept. 9 and 10).

☆ **CU CHI :** 320 G.I.s Knocked Out, 15 Armoured Cars Destroyed, 20 Planes and Helicopters Downed, Destroyed or Damaged (Sept. 17-20).

HAI PHONG FACING U.S. PLANES

by Our Special Correspondent

HIGHWAY 5, a 100-kilometer long road famous in the former resistance war against the French colonialists, runs east-west across the Red River Delta, one of the most thickly-populated areas in Viet Nam. With its railway, it was then the "umbilical cord" of the political and military apparatus set up in Hanoi. In spite of its blockhouses, watchtowers, motorized patrols and air reconnaissance missions, it was opened to traffic only in the day-time. Our guerrillas unexpectedly blew up vehicles and trains, and wiped out strong enemy columns in skillful land ambushes.

If you come into Hai Phong, you ride now on a section of forty kilometers of road lined with ruins wrought by U.S. planes especially since last spring. Townships and other agglomerations have been systematically razed. The civilians have suffered losses but the road and the railway are opened to a round-the-clock traffic, the bombed sections being repaired within a few hours by brigades of young volunteers.

When the road approaches North Vietnam's biggest seaport city, more evidence of monstrous U.S. crimes is seen. Whole hamlets have been napalmed. A pig-raising farm which could in no way be taken for a military target has been wiped out.

The devastated suburbs and quarters in the west of this city with a present population of 200,000 cover a stretch of 2 kilometers long and 1 kilometre wide. They remain one of the European cities bombed in World War II with their blasted houses, their heaps of bricks and concrete, their truncated trees, their posts entangled with barbed wire. The square with the Unknown Warrior's Memorial has disappeared. A girl secondary school has been blasted. A clinic of pediatrics and a T.B. centre have been heavily damaged.

425 south to 2,000-ha bombs, 36 containers totalling 3,000 steel-pellet bombs were dropped and 20 six-inch surface missiles, 40 rockets, thousands of 20-mm shells, were fired on the city on September 17, 17, 18 and 21 in 11

raids totalling 302 sorties.

In spite of violent and barbarous U.S. raids, Hai Phong has managed to limit the damage. Thanks to adequate measures of evacuation and dispersion of factories, production has been kept going.

In September also, Hai Phong shot down 31 U.S. planes, i.e. one-third of the total of U.S. planes shot down over North Viet Nam in the whole month. The major part of the work was done by A.A. units, but the suburban militia downed 6 planes, one of them at Doan Lap with four rifle shots. In mid-September, Missile Unit 3 hit 2 planes with only one missile; the remaining two planes of the same formation, seriously damaged, probably crashed into the sea.

In spite of their bitter losses, the U.S. aggressors have not reached their objective which is to bring the economic activities to a standstill and to impair the morale of the people.

During a bombing raid Mai, a savings-bank employee, ran into a shelter with her little child. The latter was killed in 4½ years by a splinter. Overcoming her great terror, she lay it down and dashed into the blazing office to save the office money and documents.

October 2-7, 1967

- 36 U.S. Planes Downed, Including 11 over Hai Phong, 9 over Ha Bac and 5 over Ha Noi.
- Many Pilots Captured.



aggressors sought to destroy the power station. So far Hai Phong has never had a single power failure. The electric network has been enlarged and improved with a view to serving the "3 tons of rice per hectare" campaign. Engineers, technicians and workers have found means to restore the current within the shortest time after every bombing.

In the periphery of the city, agricultural work goes on, from September 4 to 12, 23, 24, district alone — in the north — moved 14,000 cubic metres of earth for hydraulic works.

The agricultural produce processing factory, awarded a Labour Medal for having over fulfilled its 1966 plan, has decided to fulfil its 1967 plan 21 days ahead of schedule.

Remarkable is the fact that the Department of Regional Industries has just held a congress on rationalization. It was reported that in the course of the last nine months, 868 innovations (as many as in the whole year 1966) had been introduced or applied, certain of them raising production twentyfold.

The U.S. air force's selected targets have been bridges, and roads leading to the city, and the harbour. Like other places in North Viet Nam, Hai Phong has kept ready emergency means to cross the streams. Its brigades of young volunteers are available on the communication line at any time. They have devised a method to repair the line in 10 hours, thus saving from 1 to 3 days for each operation.

Chief Sharp, Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific forces, wanted to block Hai Phong. I was there at the end of September and saw a September 10, 1967, under a slogan put forth on the occasion of the 22nd anniversary of the August Revolution and of the launch of the D.V.N.'s "rapidly and 3 miles" (to rapidly unload ships and rapidly evacuate human and goods — store the goods and aid material equipment well and well prepared to fight the enemy).

A foundry was surprised in vain have the Yankees

U.S. AIR RAIDS DULY PUNISHED IN SEPTEMBER 1967

93 PLANES DOWNED INCLUDING 2 B.52S

In September 1967, the American aggressors stepped up their war of destruction against North Viet Nam. Many localities including Hai Phong, Vinh Linh and Quang Binh, were subject to the most savage air attacks. But they received hand blows from our A.A. defence: 93 planes of various types (B-57, F-4, F-105 and B-53) were downed.

On the first three days of September, our armed forces and people in Quang Binh, Nghe An, Thanh Hoa, Ninh Binh and Hai Phong brought down 19 planes and set afire 4 war vessels.

In Hai Phong 31 planes were grounded, many American pilots killed or captured. For the first time in North Viet Nam, 2 B-53 strategic bombers were downed over Vinh Linh. Quang Binh contributes an important part to our victory by downing 14 marauder planes.

Our young air force downed 23 planes in 7 sorties, thus debunking the myth of "U.S. air supremacy." Particularly, in close co-ordination with our A.A. defence and militiamen, it downed one jet on September 30 not including the two jets downed on September 17 over Son La.

by an air marauder. Sung, a furnace worker, was then standing on a scaffolding. As bombs exploded close to the factory, the foreman ordered him to step down and take cover. Before doing so, he managed to stop his machine. He later gave the reason of his behaviour to those who asked him questions about it: "We couldn't possibly abandon the furnace to itself. It would have been a success for the Yankees!"

Bay, just repatriated from New Caledonia, was a 35-year-old married man. He said he had the record of 35 tons of freight handled on a ship, and the usual rate of 35 tons, 35 tons. Her comrade Ngoc, 30, distinguished herself by the last ton of freight on her shining truck always in working order. The dockers' work was always delayed the usual freight handled per hour by 30 to 45 tons. Such high rate of work made the harbour activities have not been seriously hindered by U.S. raids as expected by the U.S. Our people's war can successfully push any up-to-date economic techniques and weapons.

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ON THE SOUTH VIET NAM N.F.L. POLITICAL PROGRAMME

REUNIFICATION OF VIET NAM BY PEACEFUL MEANS

The South Viet Nam N.F.L. Political Programme has put forth a solemn demand and consistent with sense and sentiment to a problem which is the object of the Vietnamese people's deep aspirations and resolute struggle: the peaceful reunification of the country. This solution has elicited widespread response in the two zones of Viet Nam, expression of which can be found in the following excerpts.

Editor

VIET NAM is one, the Vietnamese people are one. No force can divide our Fatherland. Reunification of the country is the sacred aspiration of our entire people. Viet Nam must be reunified.

The policy of the South Viet Nam National Front for Liberation is as follows:

1. The reunification of Viet Nam will be realized step by step and through peaceful means on the principle of negotiations between the two zones without either side using pressure against the other and without foreign interference.

2. Pending the reunification of the country, the people in both zones will make joint efforts to oppose foreign invasion and defend their Fatherland and at the same time

endeavour to expand economic and cultural exchanges. The people in both zones are free to exchange letters, to go from one zone to another and to choose their place of residence.

(South Viet Nam N.F.L. Political Programme, Part III)

INSPIRED by this truth: "Nothing is more precious than independence and freedom," bound to the South by blood ties, we are very grateful to their compatriots in the South for their lofty contribution to the great struggle against U.S. aggression, for national salvation, the North Vietnamese people are determined to put into practice this moving words of President Ho Chi Minh: "The 17 million compatriots in the

North are determined to keep their pledge to struggle side by side with their 14 million kith and kin in the South with a view to liberating the South, defending the North and eventually achieving national reunification."

To respond to the N.F.L. Political Programme in a realistic way, the compatriots and fighters in the North will emulate one another in increasing production, in fighting, and in improving their living conditions, completely fulfilling their duty as the great rear towards the great front.

(Excerpt from the Political Report of the 10th Central Committee of the Party, President of the Viet Nam Fatherland Front Central Com-

mittee at the Extraordinary Meeting, Sept. 7, 1967).

In the course of their 4,000-year-old history, our people from North to South have struggled through centuries for independence and national reunification. Today our sacred duty is to liberate the South, defend the North and proceed towards the reunification of the country. Never before in their national history have they waged such a valiant struggle and reaped so glorious victories. Successes follow one another in the North and in the South, the two zones emulate one another in fighting against the enemy. The South responds to the North's call, Mr. Nguyen Huu Tao, President of the N.F.L.

The N.F.L. Political Programme expresses our people's deep aspiration for national reunification and points out the way the South Vietnamese people must take to fulfil its duty as the great rear towards the great front: it will certainly free our 17 million kith and kin in the North with enthusiasm.

(Excerpt from the program of the Central Committee of the South Vietnamese National Front, Viet Nam N.F.L.)

Extraordinary Congress of the South Viet Nam N.F.L. (Aug. 1967).
President of the Congress: First row (centre): Mr. Nguyen Huu Tao, President of the N.F.L.

"Pacification"—A Bitter Failure of the Yankees and Their Lackeys in South Viet Nam

ACCORDING to Western sources, the U.S. military is committing 14 out of its 12 infantry regiments to "pacification" duty. Earlier, on July 21, 1967 AP disclosed that "dozens more American infantry regiments could be deployed (South Viet Nam against the guerrillas."

Thus the American aggressors have gone a step further in their "pacification" job, a life-and-death issue in the aggressive war against South Viet Nam. One that their lackeys in Saigon have made into a "policy" and have been striving to implement throughout the last ten years. In this war they perpetrate no end of bloody crimes against the South Vietnamese people but they also suffer ever heavier casualties at the hands of their victims.

UNDER Ngo Dinh Diem, the U.S. advisers, "sham independence and democracy" and land reform, and countless other swindles, the White House was unable to convert the South Viet Nam people from rising up, especially the peasants from opposing the totalitarian regime set up by Washington as a mainstay to carry out American neo-colonialism. "Great Swamp zones," "resettlement centres," then "strategic hamlets," mushroomed everywhere. These disguised concentration camps, in particular the "strategic hamlets," reminiscent of the medieval ban prisoners, had been erected since 1950-1961 under the Stanley-Taylor

plan to put a grip on the people in the vast rural countryside when Washington and Saigon felt they could no longer rule as in the past. This shift from deceptive neo-colonialist political rule to outright violent terror marked the first step in the U.S. military's "pacification" in South Viet Nam. The crisis and collapse of Ngo Dinh Diem's nepotistic rule and the fiasco of the special warfare against the failure of the policy of ruling South Viet Nam country by means of the "strategic hamlet" system. Tens of thousands of these camps were smashed in 1964 and 1965. The people, especially the peasants, rose up and widespread political and armed struggles, and guerrilla warfare developed like horsetails, sprang everywhere. In the winter 1966-Spring 1967 the Pentagon has to equalise the situation by sending in the puppet troops (with the regular army making up 65 per cent of the contingent) and fighting around villages for "pacification" while the American "strategic hamlets," launched operations against major L.A.F. units to protect their "strategic hamlets".

Thus, Operation Cedar Falls (at the beginning of January, And when the American

comrades discovered — as when they fought against the enemy's main forces—that the Vietnamese puppet willingly handed over this job to the Americans (AP, July 21, 1967) U.S. troops just had to take it over. We note that the G.I.'s struggle with the L.A.F. main force but also with the guerrillas' mop-up and "pacification" operations. This was the only alternative of an "intensity" American with the only alternative of the "pacification" operations. These examples show that the aggressors had to use bi-volets, ultra-rapid light machine-guns and bulldozers to "win over the peasants' hearts and minds, as the American press has admitted, to use soldiers more versed in looting than in fighting for persuasion work, and to use a routed army for doing a job already doomed to failure. Clearly enough, this marked the second failure of "pacification" of the countryside. The Defence Secretary McNamara bitterly complained that "progress in pacification has been very slow," while Commander of the U.S. Forces in the Pacific General Sharp bluntly said that this "national revolutionary development" was "a strategic setback, frustrations" and "the people of the hamlets... were not strategically re-educating themselves" (USIS, April 13).

While in their "search and destroy" operations the Yankees mostly relied on their weapons

and technique and on the "pre-eminence" of their air force and army — were no match for the L.A.F. in their "pacification" places they have also been faced with great military and political problems.

As their deceitful tricks have failed and their plans gone bankrupt, the Americans have no other alternative than to carry out "pacification" by the traditional method of colonialist-imperialist "punitive expeditions." Henceforth their aggressive nature has been all the more transparent. Western news agencies and press covering the herding of population in Ben Son, in the demilitarized zone or in other places had to mention the wrath and opposition of the population. In carrying out "pacification" U.S. troops have witnessed the abyme between the native people and the aggressors and exacerbated the contradictions between them. This has been borne out by the protests of the South Viet Nam peasantry and their demands for an end to U.S.-puppet troops' raids.

On the other hand, how could the G.I.'s whose arms were low for want of an ideal to fight for, feel no qualms of conscience regarding their

(Continued page 6)

QUANG TRI:

**L.A.F. BIG VICTORIES
AT CON TIEN AND
GIO LINH**

ACCORDING to *Giai Phong* Press Agency, from Sept. 22 to 25, the L.A.F. launched repeated attacks against Con Tien and east of Gio Linh. On Sept. 22, they shelled a position of U.S. Marines north of Trung An, 15 km south of Con Tien, killing 150 men.

On Sept. 23, another pounding at Con Tien and Trung An took a toll of 120 G.I.s.

On Sept. 24, a fleeing American unit intercepted by the L.A.F. at 4 km south-south-east of Con Tien, suffered 70 casualties. In a L.A.F. shelling at a position 2 km south-east of Con Tien, the U.S. Marines had 120 men killed or wounded and many military vehicles destroyed.

Meanwhile, the enemy troops at Gio Linh tried to get out of the L.A.F. investment by launching an operation to occupy a narrow strip of land advantageous to them lying between the sea and Highway 1.

On Sept. 22, Battalion 2, U.S. Marines Regiment 3, made a thrust to Nhi Thuong and Ha Lai, east and north-east of Gio Linh, near the seacoast, but had 50 men killed and wounded and 3 tanks destroyed by a well co-ordinated action between the three kinds of the Liberation Armed Forces.

On Sept. 23, at the same locality and at Nhai Ha, south of Nhi Thuong, mortars of the regional troops and cannons of the regular army pounded the enemy who had been reinforced by one puppet para battalion, thus creating favourable conditions for our footmen to kill and wound 600 enemy soldiers. G.I.s included.

After these two defeats, on Sept. 24, the enemy concentrated their operation on Nhai Trung and Nhai Thuong but suffered 150 casualties.

In total, from Sept. 22 to 25, the L.A.F. killed or wounded 600 U.S. and puppet troops, destroyed 6 tanks and many other military vehicles, and seized one tank.

QUANG NAM:

**10 ENEMY POSITIONS
STORMED, 330 ENEMY
TROOPS PUT OUT
OF ACTION ON THE NIGHTS
OF SEPTEMBER 9 AND 10**

GIAI PHONG Press Agency reported that on the nights of Sept. 9 and 10, the L.A.F. shelled and stormed to enemy positions, military sectors and sub-

sectors (including the Hoi An sector, Nien Nhon sub-sector, Nam Phuc district town, the post of Cam Son, Dong Lai and Ba Ren).

The hardest hit were the Hien Nhon sector and Nam Phuc district town in which 2 companies and 6 platoons were completely wiped out, 50 civilians detained by the enemy were set free.

In these two nights, the L.A.F. put out of action 330 enemy troops, including 2 companies and 8 platoons, and seized a great quantity of weapons and military equipment.

CU CHI:

**350 G.I.s PUT OUT OF
ACTION, 15 ARMOURD
CARS DESTROYED, 30 AIR-
CRAFT DOWNED, DE-
STROYED OR DAMAGED
(SEPTEMBER 17-20)**

ACCORDING to *Giai Phong* Press Agency, on Sept. 17, 3 battalions of U.S. Infantry Division 25, supported by 120 planes and helicopters, 300 military vehicles, raided two villages north of Cu Chi district, but were intercepted by the guerrillas and local troops. On that night (Sept. 17), the Ranger training center at Trung Hoa was stormed, the position of a U.S. Infantry battalion and many logistic centres were heavily pounded, 120 G.I.s killed or wounded, 4 choppers and 2 armoured cars destroyed, a 105mm cannons damaged, many tents and trucks loaded with ammunition and military equipment set ablaze.

On Sept. 18, 19 and 20, using various forms of fighting, the guerrillas killed or wounded 300 G.I.s, destroyed 15 armoured carriers and shot down or damaged 30 aircraft.

BINH THUAN:

**130 ENEMY SOLDIERS
PUT OUT OF ACTION AT
PHAN THIET, PHAN RI
AND HAM THUAN**

GIAI PHONG Press Agency reported that on Aug. 27, 30 and 31 the L.A.F. shelled the enemy positions at Phan Thiet provincial town and Phan Ri district town, wiping out 60 men. The following week, the guerrillas and local troops of Ham Thuan district put out of action 70 security men, "civil guards" and "pacification cadres".

**U.S. LOSSES IN MY THO,
VINH LONG, QUANG TRI
AND THUA THIEN FROM
THE END OF AUGUST TO
MID-SEPTEMBER**

ACCORDING to an overall report by *Giai Phong* Press Agency:



U.S. tanks destroyed by L.A.F.

**CON TIEN and GIO LINH:
GRAVEYARDS FOR THE G.I.s**

ENTERING the 1967 spring-summer period the armed forces and people of Quang Tri-Thua Thien closely co-ordinated their actions with other theatres and dealt thunder blows at the enemy. Though switching over to the defensive, the latter could not avoid annihilation.

Hardly had the Khe Sanh battle come to a close on May 3 with 1,850 U.S. and puppet troops knocked down when the L.A.F. attacked Con Tien, Doc Mieu and Dong Ha on May 7, wiping out 1,150 more G.I.s. The U.S. forces who had recklessly intruded into the southern part of the Demilitarized Zone on May 18 met with instant punishment. In 4 days only they had 2,000 officers and men killed and wounded, while in the engagement at Dong Ha the L.A.F. struck at U.S. Marine Division 3, and inflicted 1,000 casualties on it.

Following up their successes the L.A.F. lured the Yankees to Gio An and wiped out 1,350 men in 5 days beginning July 2. From then onwards, their artillery had been shelling his positions at Con Tien, Doc Mieu, Gio Linh and other places, and not a single unit could escape their blows once out of its base, for instance the annihilation of 400 men of Battalion 3, U.S. Marine Regiment 9, on July 20 moving from Con Tien to Cam Son, or the artillery shelling of Dong Ha, Gio Linh and Doc Mieu on the night of August 28, which caused 360 fresh

Between Aug. 31 and Sept. 10, 1967, the L.A.F. put out of action 2,000 G.I.s and puppet troops, destroyed 45 armoured cars and 10 military vehicles, burnt or sank 28 war vessels, downed 8 aircraft and destroyed 40 "strategic hamlets" along Highway 4. My Tho province.

In Vinh Long province, between Aug. 25 and Sept.

10, the enemy had 490 soldiers killed, wounded or captured and 14 bridges and culverts destroyed or blown up.

In Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces, between Aug. 28 and Sept. 13, 4,000 G.I.s were wiped out, 130 military vehicles destroyed or set afire and 25 aircraft destroyed or damaged.

casualties among the enemy. Commenting on one of those shelling *AFP* correspondent Bob Willard had this to say:

"...When we emerged five minutes later, the 100 metres between us and the command bunker looked like 1,000. And when we ran for it and sank knee deep into the mud, it was like living a nightmare.

"...Just a few metres beyond that perimeter is 'Indian country' from where 'Charlie' (name given to the L.A.F. by the G.I.s—Ed.) blasts anything and anybody in the camp with every weapon in his arsenal.

"One fuz-heckled corporal attached to the command post admitted frankly 'I'm going crazy'..."

In this distressed situation the aggressor had to pay a very high price for their adventurous actions. Penetrating into Bai Son south of Con Tien he had 300 G.I.s killed and injured, and 12 tanks destroyed (Sept. 7). At Ho Khe also south of Con Tien, another 300 were knocked out along with tanks and armoured vehicles destroyed (Sept. 10). The badly mauled Americans found themselves isolated at Con Tien where on the night of September 20 and the following day the L.A.F. wiped out 300 G.I.s and 26 tanks. Between Sept. 22 and 26, the L.A.F. resumed the shelling of Con Tien and the surrounding positions,

putting out of action 600 G.I.s. Meanwhile, in order to break through the L.A.F. encirclement the Yankees attempted to press towards the coastal area south of Gio Linh district, sandwiched between Highway 1 and the sea. In three days (Sept. 22-24), however, 300 U.S. and puppet troops were wiped out.

On the other hand, the fighting on Highway 9 after the winter of 1966 and spring of 1967 has brought out the fact that the L.A.F. continues to take the offensive. The longer they fight the better off they are and their opposition is left on increasingly uncomfortable corner.

Fighting in the Con Tien-Gio Linh area also bespeaks the ability to carry out concerted actions of all the three categories of the Liberation Armed Forces (guerrillas, regional troops and regular army).

Furthermore, the L.A.F. keep the enemy under a constant heavy artillery fire at the very time when, ironically enough, he vacillously boasts of his modern weapons, such as long-range ultra-rapid 170mm cannons and 30-ton load B.52 bombers.

The operations north of Highway 9 are most vivid illustrations of the fact that after the winter of 1966 and the spring of 1967 the U.S. forces, who had lost their "counter-offensive" capacity, had to fall back to the defensive and were unable to ward off defeats.